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SANTA FE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT V. DOE:
CAN "MOMENT OF SILENCE" STATUTES SURVIVE?
Michael A. Umayam+
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in
part, that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion."' The Supreme Court has imposed this principle upon all
of the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.2 In Santa Fe
Independent School District v. Doe,3 the Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether a state school district violated the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause.4 More specifically, the Court
analyzed a policy created by the Santa Fe Independent School
District (District) that allowed student-led, student-initiated prayer
before varsity home football games over the school's public address
system.5 The Court struck down the District's policy as "invalid on
its face,"6 but limited its holding to policies that permitted "student-
led, student-initiated prayer at football games."7
Some questions regarding the constitutional limits of prayer in
public schools however, remain unanswered." Although the Supreme
Court attempted to limit the scope of the Santa Fe holding to
student-initiated prayer at football games, the decision may lead to
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2001, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (noting that the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment imposed "substantive limitations on the States' power to
legislate the First Amendment"). The Fourteenth Amendment, in relevant part,
states:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
4. Id. at 294.
5. Id. at 294-95.
6. Id. at 317.
7. Id. at 301.
8. See Edward Walsh & Bill Miller, School Prayer Is Dealt a Blow; High Court Strikes
Down Tex. Policy Allowing Student-Led Invocations, WASH. POST, June 20, 2000, at Al
(reporting that the "ruling is likely to lead to new challenges to [public] school district
policies that allow 'moments of silence' and student-led prayers at official functions).
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the conclusion that many other governmental policies violate the
Establishment Clause.9  Consequently, many "moment of silence"
state laws are ripe for constitutional challenge.'0
The Santa Fe Independent School District, a political subdivision
in Texas located in the southern part of the state, is responsible for
educating more than 4,000 students." Prior to 1995, Santa Fe High
School, the District's only high school, allowed prayer before each
varsity football game. 2 The student council chaplain delivered the
prayer over the school's public address system. 3 Two sets of current
and former students challenged this practice in the district court by
claiming it violated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. 14
The district court modified the policy to permit only nonsectarian,
nonproselytizing prayer at football games, but refused to grant
injunctive relief to stop prayer altogether.15  Although the district
court declared that the words "nonsectarian" and "nonproselytizing"
were required to survive constitutional scrutiny under the First
Amendment, the court permitted prayers at football games that
referenced the "'Almighty,' or to 'God,' or to 'Our Heavenly Father (or
Mother)' or the like."'
On appeal, a split panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court's ruling that the words "nonsectarian" and "nonproselytizing"
constituted necessary elements of a viable and constitutional prayer
policy. 17 However, the court failed to recognize football games as the
type of somber annual event appropriately solemnized with a18
prayer. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's holding,
in part, and held that the Establishment Clause did not permit
prayer at school football games."
9. See id.
10. Bill Miller, Ruling May Leave 'Moment of Silence' Laws Vulnerable, WASH. POST,
June 20, 2000, at A10 (speculating that the Court's ruling could fuel new challenges
to laws permitting "moments of silence" in public schools).
11. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 294.
12. Id.
13. Id. The student body elected the student council chaplain. Id.
14. Id. The plaintiffs complained that the District allowed students to deliver
"overtly" Christian prayers over the public address system at home football games.
Id. at 295. The plaintiffs also challenged the constitutionality of a school policy that
allowed students to read Christian invocations and benedictions at graduation
ceremonies. Id.
15. See Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 1999), affd,
530 U.S. 290, 317 (2000) (permitting "nondenominational prayers").
16. Id. at 811. This decision also applied to the school's policy, which allowed
student-led prayer at graduation ceremonies. Id.
17. Id. at 824.
18. Id. at 823.
19. Id. at 823-24. In his dissent, Judge Jolly argued that the majority committed
two primary errors that allowed it "to free fall into the black pit of the constitutionally
forbidden." Id. at 824 (Jolly, J., dissenting). First, Judge Jolly suggested the majority
870 [Vol. 50:839
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The District, disappointed with the Fifth Circuit's decision,
petitioned for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.20 The
Supreme Court faced the issue of whether "'[the District's] policy
permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games
violates the Establishment Clause.'-'2  The Court affirmed the Fifth
Circuit and specifically found that an objective student would believe
the school approved the prayer, and that the school likewise
encouraged student participation in the prayer.22 Moreover, the
Court found that school approval of religious messages improperly
"sends the ancillary message to members of the audience who are
nonadherents 'that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community.' 23  Further, the Court rejected the District's
argument that the policy had secular purposes and determined that
the District implemented the policy for the sole purpose of endorsing
prayer." Therefore, the Court found that the District's policy violated
the Establishment Clause.25
In contrast, the dissent argued that the majority misconstrued the
policy to allow a student election on "prayer" and "religion" at football
games. 26 The dissent claimed that the District's policy had plausible
secular, purposes, such as solemnizing the event, promoting good
sportsmanship and good safety, and establishing the appropriate
environment for competition, and that Establishment Clause
jurisprudence did not require the "content neutrality" that the
majority demanded.
misread prior precedent when it concluded that a "'nonsectarian, nonproselytizing'
requirement constitute[d] a necessary element" in upholding the prayer policy. d. at
825 (Jolly, J., dissenting). Second, Judge Jolly stated that the majority erred when it
failed "to recognize that the government may not restrict religious speech based on
viewpoint when the government has created a forum for the expression of privately
held views." d. at 825 & n.4 (Jolly, J., dissenting).
20. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301 (2000); see also Ralph D.
Mawdsley & Charles J. Russo, 143 EDUC. L. REP. 415, 416 (2000) (reducing the scope
of their article into two parts: (1) reviewing the Fifth Circuit decision in Santa Fe, and
(2) predicting how the Supreme Court would rule).
21. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 301.
22. Id. at 308.
23. Id. at 309-10. (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor,
J., concurring)).
24. Id. at 315 (refusing to "turn a blind eye to the context in which the policy
arose"). The Court acknowledged that the government is entitled to deference
regarding secular purposes for religious policies, but stated that courts must
"'distinguish] a sham secular purpose from a sincere one."' Id. at 308 (quoting
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 75 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
25. Id. at 317 (elaborating that the policy fails because it "establishes an improper
majoritarian election on religion" and implies that the school encourages prayer at
school events).
26. Id. at 320 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (finding specifically that the policy
allowed students to vote on whether to have a speaker and, if the students voted to
have a speaker, who that speaker would be).
27. Id. at 324, 325 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
20011 871
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This Note explores the development of the First Amendment law
that limits school prayer, with a particular emphasis on United
States Supreme Court decisions regarding prayer in public schools.
Next, this Note examines the District's policy that permitted prayer
before public high school football games. This Note then analyzes
the Supreme Court's Santa Fe decision in light of previous Supreme
Court jurisprudence regarding violations of the Establishment
Clause. This Note concludes that the Court's decision to strike down
the District's policy on the grounds that it violated the Establishment
Clause was unwarranted because the policy was neither an
unconstitutional endorsement of religion nor unconstitutionally
coercive. This Note also concludes that the implications of the Santa
Fe decision will lead to new and successful challenges to state laws
that allow for a "moment of silence" in public schools.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW LIMITING SCHOOL PRAYER
A. An Overview Of The Establishment Clause
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution prohibits Congress from enacting laws respecting
an establishment of religion. 28 Although there is universal agreement
28. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
The Establishment Clause, drafted in 1789, "intended to prohibit government
sponsorship of religious activities." Nancy E. Drane, Comment, The Supreme Court's
Missed Opportunity: The Constitutionality of Student-Led Graduation Prayer in Light of
the Crumbling Wall Between Church and State, 31 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 497, 503 & n.57
(2000): see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (quoting a letter
from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptists Association that fashioned the
phrase "separation between church and state"). Professor R.K. Ramazani of the
University of Virginia, a noted author and historian, argues that the Founding
Fathers intended for the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses to ensure that a
state could not dictate an individual's beliefs. Editorial, TAMPA TRIB. TIMES, Oct. 3 1,
1999, at 2 (arguing that tolerance is necessary when state and religious interests
overlap); see also Herbert S. Fain, Jr., Prayer in Public Schools: A Moment of Silence,
15 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 27, 34 (1989) (finding the Founding Fathers desired to
safeguard individuals from encumbrances of a state mandated religion). One
commentator believes the Founding Fathers also wanted to protect the government
from religious influence and protect religion from government influence, but that the
Founding Fathers did not mean to require the government to be actively hostile
toward religious expression in order to ensure religious neutrality. Editorial, TAMPA
TRIB. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1999, at 2.
The Supreme Court first dealt with the Establishment Clause in Everson v. Board of
Education of the Township of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). In Everson, the Court noted
that the Establishment Clause originated from the early settlers' attempt to "escape
the bondage of laws which compelled them to support and attend government-favored
churches." Id. at 8. These early settlers witnessed as the jailing, torturing, and
killing of those who spoke disrespectfully to ministers, failed to attend church
services, expressed unbelief, and neglected to pay taxes and tithes to support
872 [Vol. 50:839
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that the Establishment Clause prohibits the creation of an official
church , much of the agreement stops at this basic principle.3 ° The
Supreme Court has relied on three different approaches to determine
the constitutionality of government actions regarding the
establishment of religion in public schools 1
The Supreme Court enunciated one Establishment Clause test in
Lemon v. Kurtzman.32  The Lemon Court established that a
government practice violates the Establishment Clause if the
practice: (1) lacks a secular purpose; (2) has the primary effect of
advancing or inhibiting religion; or (3) excessively entangles
government with religion.33 Several Justices, however, have sharply
criticized the Lemon Test and have called for its repudiation.34
churches. See id. at 9. As such, the early settlers "reached the conviction that
individual religious liberty could be achieved best under a government which was
stripped of all power to tax, to support, or otherwise to assist any or all religions, or to
interfere with the beliefs of any religious individual or group." Id. at 11; see also
Fain, supra, at 33 (asserting that the Founders drafted and adopted the First
Amendment for the purpose of maintaining religious freedom and preventing
punishment of nonbelievers).
In light of this history, the Everson Court found that the government could not
establish a church, force or influence an individual to profess a particular belief,
punish an individual for professing or entertaining particular religious beliefs, or levy
a tax to support any religious activity or institution. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16.
Open or secret participation in any religious group or organization by the government
would also violate the Establishment Clause. See id. at 16. The Court did uphold a
New Jersey program that allowed taxpayer funds to pay for the bus fares of parochial
school students. See id. at 17. This particular program was part of a more general
program that paid for the bus fares of students attending public and private schools.
See id.
29. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15 ("Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set
up a church."); GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1500
(13th ed. 1997) (asserting that all interpretations of the Establishment Clause agree
that it prohibits the creation of an official church).
30. See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 29, at 1500; see also Lamb's Chapel v.
Center of Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 399 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (noting the "Establishment Clause geometry of crooked lines and
wavering shapes"); Harlan A. Loeb, Suffering in Silence: Camouflaging the Redefinition
of the Establishment Clause, 77 OR. L. REV. 1305, 1335 (1998) (asserting that the
Supreme Court's inconsistency in Establishment Clause jurisprudence has given
state courts "excessive leeway" in interpreting cases); Ronald D. Wenkart, Prayer in
School: Can a Solution Be Found?, 138 EDUC. L. REP. 597, 598 (1999) (stating that the
words of the Establishment Clause have been difficult for courts to define).
31. See Daniel Washburn, Comment, Student-Initiated Religious Speech in Public
Schools [Chandler v. James, 180 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 1999)], 39 WASHBURN L.J. 273,
276 (2000) (mentioning the three approaches that the Supreme Court uses in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence). Washburn concluded that the Eleventh Circuit
correctly analyzed student-initiated religious speech as private speech, and, thus,
constituted constitutional speech under the First Amendment. Id. at 287.
32. 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971) (holding that state statutes providing state aid to
church-related elementary and secondary schools violate the Constitution).
33. Id. at 612-13.
34. See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 29, at 1501 (noting that the Lemon Test
20011 873
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The Court announced a second test in Lee v. Weisman,35 which is
commonly referred to as the Coercion Test.36  Under this test, the
Court analyzes "school-sponsored religious ... activity to determine
the extent... [of its] coercive effect on students."3 7 Unconstitutional
coercion occurs when the government directs a formal religious
exercise that forces the participation of objectors.3"
A third test, known as the Endorsement Test, attempts to
determine whether the government endorses religion through
governmental action. 9  The Endorsement Test determines that a
government action is unconstitutional if it "endorses," "favors,"
prefers," or "promotes" a certain religious belief over another.4 °
Though Establishment Clause jurisprudence is less than clear,
courts analyze government practices challenged on Establishment
Clause grounds under these three complementary, and occasionally
overlapping, tests established by the Supreme Court.4' The Court
currently eschews the application of a single test and evaluates
Establishment Clause claims with a combination of all three.42
B. A Review of Supreme Court Decisions Limiting Prayer in Public
Schools
1. Engel v. Vitale: The First Step in Limiting Prayer in Public Schools
The Supreme Court first limited school prayer in public schools
has survived formal renunciation despite criticism). The principle criticisms of the
Lemon Test are:
(1) that the "purpose" requirement, taken literally, would invalidate all
deliberate government accommodation of religion, even though such
accommodation is sometimes required by the [FIree [Eixercise [Clause, and
has sometimes been held permissible under the [Elstablishment [CIlause
even if not constitutionally compelled; (2) that legislative "purpose" is in any
case difficult to ascertain in a multi-member body, and (3) that the
"entanglement" prong contradicts the previous two... (However, slome
administrative "entanglement" is essential to ensure that government aid
does not excessively promote religious purposes.
Id.
35. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
36. See, e.g., Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 814 (5th Cir. 1999),
reh'g en banc denied, 171 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), affd, 530 U.S. 290,
317 (2000) (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992)).
37. Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 814.
38. See, e.g., Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 969-70 (5th Cir.
1992) (referring to Weisman, 505 U.S. at 577) (Clear Creek II).
39. See Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593-94 (1989).
40. Id.
41. See Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 814.
42. See Martha McCarthy, Religion and Education: Whither the Establishment
Clause?, 75 IND. L.J. 123, 160-62, 164-65 (2000) (examining the changing
Establishment Clause doctrine regarding devotional activities in public schools).
874 [Vol. 50:839
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in its landmark decision of Engel v. Vitale.43 The New York State
Board of Regents, a government agency with broad supervisory,
executive, and legislative powers, recommended that each school
district recite a daily prayer at the beginning of every school day.44
This recommendation prompted the Board of Education of Union
Free School District No. 9 to direct that such a prayer be recited.45
Shortly after the School District adopted this policy, the parents of
ten students filed suit in state court claiming that this recitation
46
violated the First Amendment. In response, the State argued that
the prayer program did not establish religious beliefs because it was
nondenominational, the school district did not require all students to
recite it, and the policy allowed all students who wished not to
participate to remain silent or be excused from the room.47
Without citing a single case and over Justice Stewart's lone
dissent, the Supreme Court held that the recitation of the daffy
prayer was entirely inconsistent with the Establishment Clause.
47
The Court described the daily classroom invocation as a "religious
activity" and stated that the Establishment Clause prohibits the
composition of official prayers that are recited as part of a religious
program created by the government.49
The Court rejected the State's arguments because, in its opinion,
the drafters of the Constitution included the First Amendment to
guarantee that the federal government would not control, support, or
pressure an individual's choice of religion.50 Because Establishment
43. 370 U.S. 421 (1962); see Drane, supra note 28, at 511 (pointing out that the
Court first considered school prayer in Engel); Gunther & Sullivan, supra note 29, at
1504 (describing Engel as the Court's first encounter with school prayer initiated by
school officials).
44. Engel, 370 U.S. at 422-23. State officials composed the prayer and published it
as a part of their 'Statement on Moral and Spiritual Training in the Schools,' which
stated that: "'We believe that this Statement will be subscribed to by all men and
women of good will, and we call upon all of them to aid in giving life to our program."'
Id. at 423.
45. See id. at 422. The prayer read as follows: "'Almighty God, we acknowledge our
dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers
and our Country."' Id.
46. See id. at 423 (insisting that prayer in public schools contravened "the beliefs,
religions, or religious practices of both themselves and their children").
47. See id. at 430.
48. Id. at 424. Justice Stewart thought the majority "misapplied a great
constitutional principle" as he could not see how "an 'official religion' [was]
established by letting those who want to say a prayer say it." Id. at 444, 445
(Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart would have focused on the "history of the
religious traditions of [the American] people, reflected in countless practices of the
institutions and officials of [their] government," and upheld the school district's
policy. Id. at 446, 450 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 424-25.
50. Id. at 429-30; see also Drane, supra note 28, at 511 (observing that the Court
expressed a "traditional separatist view between church and state" in finding the
policy unconstitutional); Margaret Richardson, Comment, The Constitutionality of
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 50:839
Clause violations occur through laws that establish religion,
regardless of whether those laws operate to coerce nonobserving
individuals directly, the Court held that "[nleither the fact that the
prayer may be denominationally neutral nor the fact that its
observance on the part of the students is voluntary can serve to free
it from the limitations of the Establishment Clause."5 ' Accordingly,
the New York school district's daily prayer policy did not survive
52
constitutional scrutiny.
2. Abington School District v. Schempp: Broadening the Limits of
School Prayer in Public Schools
One year after Engel, the Supreme Court extended the
Establishment Clause principles articulated in Engel beyond state-
composed prayers.5 3  In Abington School District v. Schempp,54 the
Supreme Court considered whether state laws mandating the reading
of verses from the Holy Bible at the start of each day in public
schools violated the Establishment Clause.5
North Carolina's Moment of Silence Statute, 22 N.C. CENT. L.J. 200, 210 (1996)
(remarking that the Court strongly relied on the "theory of a 'wall' of separation"
between church and state).
51. Engel, 370 U.S. at 430; see Drane, supra note 28, at 511-12 (emphasizing that
the Court regarded the mere presence of a prayer written and endorsed by the state
as an unconstitutional sponsorship of religion). Referencing the history of
governmentally established religion in both England and the United States, the Court
reiterated the concern that the government would favor one religion and develop a
"hatred, disrespect and even contempt of those who held contrary beliefs." Engel, 370
U.S. at 431. The Court expressed concern about possible religious persecutions. Id.
at 432; see also Patrick F. Brown, Note, Wallace v. Jaffree and the Need To Reform
Establishment Clause Analysis, 35 CATH. U. L. REv. 573, 578 (1986) (observing that
the Court pointed to the government practice of composing prayers and compelling
their recitation as a primary reason for colonists fleeing England and seeking
religious freedom in America).
52. See Engel, 370 U.S. at 436.
53. See Gunther & Sullivan, supra note 29, at 1504-07 (summarizing the Supreme
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence).
54. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
55. Id. at 205, 211; see also Mary Ellen Quinn Johnson, Comment, School Prayer
and the Constitution: Silence Is Golden, 48 MD. L. REv. 1018, 1030 (1989). The
Schempp case challenged two state laws. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 205-12. The
Pennsylvania law at Issue required that "[alt least ten verses from the Holy Bible shall
be read, without comment, at the opening of each public school on each school day.
Any child shall be excused from such Bible reading, or attending such Bible reading,
upon the written request of his parent or guardian." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 § 15-1516
(West 1959); see also Schempp, 374 U.S. at 205. The Schempp family sued to enjoin
enforcement of the statute and contended that the statute infringed upon the family's
rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Sehempp, 374 U.S. at 205.
The second law at issue was a rule adopted by the Board of School Commissioners of
Baltimore, Maryland. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 211; see also MD. CODE ANN. EDUC. § 7-
104 (1978). The rule "provided for the holding of opening exercises in the schools of
the city, consisting primarily of the 'reading, without comment, of a chapter in the
Holy Bible and/or the use of the Lord's Prayer."' § 7-104. Two professed atheists
876
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The Supreme Court noted that to withstand constitutional scrutiny
under the Establishment Clause, a government action must have a
"secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion."56  Government action fails to
withstand constitutional scrutiny if the action violates either part of
this testy.
The Court applied these Establishment Clause principles to
Schempp and found that the state must take a neutral position on
religion.58 In this case, however, the Court characterized the policies
as not neutral. 9 Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that
state laws and practices fall short of the requirements of the
Establishment Clause when they "requir[e] the selection and reading
at the opening of the school day of verses from the Holy Bible and the
recitation of the Lord's Prayer by the students in unison.'60  The
religious nature of these exercises violated the concept of neutrality
discussed above; accordingly they could not withstand constitutional
scrutiny.6
alleged that the rule violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 212. They also claimed that the rule violated the principle of
separation between church and state. Id.
56. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222 (citing Everson v. Board of Education the Township
of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947)): see also Johnson, supra note 55, at 1030 (discussing
the two-part test for determining the constitutionality of government activity under
the Establishment Clause).
57. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222 (stating that if either the legislative purpose or
primary effect of the enactment "advance[s] or inhibit[s] ... religion[,I then the
enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the
Constitution").
58. Id. at 226. That individual students, upon parental request, may be excused
from the prayer fails to render the policy constitutional. See id. at 224-25. Further,
the Court discounted the State's argument that the religious practices constituted
"relatively minor encroachments on the First Amendment" out of concern that the
"breach of neutrality that is today a trickling stream may all too soon become a raging
torrent." Id. at 225.
59. Id. at 223 (agreeing with the trial court's assessment). The Court elaborated
upon this concept of neutrality when it adopted the Endorsement Test in Allegheny v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 621 (1989), which concluded that a nativity scene display within
a county courthouse is unconstitutional, but that the display of a Jewish menorah
next to a Christmas tree outside of a county building is constitutional. In Allegheny,
the Court held that the government violates the Establishment Clause when it
appears to "endorse," "favor," "prefer," or "promote" a certain religious belief over
others. Id. at 593-94.
60. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223; see also Wenkart, supra note 30, at 602
(interpreting Schempp to mean that by requiring Bible readings and recitation of the
Lord's Prayer, the State incorporated such practices into curriculum, thus violating
the Establishment Clause). The Court however, clarified that the First Amendment
permits the objective study of the Bible or religion when presented as component of a
secular education program. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225.
61. See id. at 223; see also Richardson, supra note 50, at 210 (commenting that,
like Engel, the Schempp Court strongly "rellied] on [the] theory of a 'wall' of
separation").
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3. Wallace v. Jaffree: Tackling the Problem of "Moments of Silence"
In Wallace v. Jaffree6 the Supreme Court decided whether an
Alabama statute, which authorized a teacher-led period of silence for
meditation or voluntary prayer, established religion within the
meaning of the First Amendment.63  A resident of Mobile County,
Alabama, challenged this statute on behalf of his three minor
children.64  The complaint sought to enjoin the State from
maintaining regular religious prayer services or observances in
public schools, such as the teacher-led period of silence, in violation
of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment .
The Court began its analysis by concluding that the First
Amendment, with all of its limitations, applies to the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.6 "[Tihe
individual freedom of conscience protected by the First Amendment
embraces the right to select any religious faith or none at all."6 7 Next,
the Court analyzed the Alabama statute to determine if: (1) it had a
secular legislative purpose; (2) its principal or primary effect
advanced or inhibited religion; or (3) it fostered an excessive
government entanglement with religion, pursuant to the Lemon
Test.6 The Court applied the Lemon Test and determined that
section 16-1-20.1 of the Alabama Code clearly did not embody any
62. 472 US. 38 (1985).
63. Id. at 41-42. The relevant section of the Alabama Code provides that:
At the commencement of the first class of each day in all grades in all public
schools, the teacher in charge of the room in which each such class is held
may announce that a period of silence not to exceed one minute in duration
shall be observed for meditation or voluntary prayer, and during any such
period no other activities shall be engaged in.
ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (1995). It is important to note that no "moment of silence"
statute existed before the Supreme Court's decisions in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962), and Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). Arval A.
Morris, School Prayer and Meditation in the Public Schools: Wallace v. Jaffree, 26
EDUC. L. REP. 13, 27 (1985) (asserting that statutes passed shortly after the Engel
and Schempp decisions indicate legislative intent to avoid adhering to the decisions);
see also Perry A. Zirkel & Christina L. Ager, Moment-of-Silence Laws After Wallace v.
Jaffree: Are They Constitutional?, 29 EDUC. L. REP. 927, 935 (1986) (observing that
"moment of silence" laws arose after Supreme Court school prayer decisions).
64. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 42 (describing the minor plaintiffs as two second grade
students and one kindergarten student).
65. Id. The plaintiff asked the trial court to prevent the State from "maintaining or
allowing the maintenance of regular religious prayer services or other forms of
religious observances in the Mobile County Public Schools in violation of the First
Amendment as made applicable to states by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
66. Id. at 49. The addition of the Fourteenth Amendment allowed the Constitution
to prohibit states from depriving liberty without due process and "imposed the same
substantive limitations on the States' power to legislate that the First Amendment
had always imposed on Congress' power." Id.
67. Id. at 53.
68. Id. at 55-56 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)).
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69
secular purpose. Instead, the Court found that the Alabama
legislature enacted the statute for the sole purpose of endorsing
prayer in its schools.70 This endorsement by the state contradicted
the established principle of complete neutrality regarding religion
that the Court required.71 As the First Amendment requires the
invalidation of a statute that is motivated entirely by the purpose of
advancing religion,72 the Court concluded section 16-1-20.1 violated
the Establishment Clause.73
4. Lee v. Weisman: Expanding the Limits Beyond the Classroom
In Lee v. Weisman,4 the Court addressed school prayer outside the
classroom when it confronted the issue of whether the inclusion of
prayers by clergy members during a school graduation ceremony
violated the Establishment Clause. Prior to this decision, the
School Committee and Superintendent of Schools for Providence,
Rhode Island, customarily allowed members of the clergy to offer
invocations and benedictions at official graduation ceremonies.
Providence school officials also routinely provided the invited clergy
with a pamphlet prepared by the National Conference of Christians
and Jews.7  This pamphlet contained guidelines for delivering
invocations at school graduations.
78
69. Id. at 56.
70. Id. at 60; Loeb, supra note 30, at 1328 The Court, in formulating its decision,
relied on the legislative record and the testimony of State Senator Donald Holmes, the
sponsor of the bill that became section 16-1-20.1, who stated that his only purpose in
supporting this bill included returning voluntary prayer to public schools. Wallace,
472 U.S at 57. Senator Holmes described the bill as "an 'effort to return voluntary
prayer to our public schools... it is a beginning and a step in the right direction."'
Fain, supra note 28, at 51 & n. 150. The State presented no evidence of a secular
purpose at trial. See Wallace, 462 U.S. at 57.
71. Wallace, 462 U.S. at 60.
72. Id. at 56. Contra Brown, supra note 51, at 588 (criticizing the Lemon Test
because it "diffuses the meaning of the Constitution and displaces the intent of the
original drafters of the [Elstablishment [CIlause with that of the members of the
Supreme Court").
73. Wallace, 462 U.S. at 61. Because the statute failed the secular purpose prong
of the Lemon Test, the Court found it unnecessary to address the primary effect and
excessive entanglement prongs. Id.; see also Martha M. McCarthy, Wallace v. Jaffree:
A Reprieve in the Erosion of the Establishment Clause?, 25 EDUC. L. REP. 19, 22 (1985)
(discussing Wallace and its relationship with other Establishment Clause cases).
Contra Chandler v. Siegelman, 230 F.3d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir. 2000) (reversing a
permanent injunction that abrogated an Alabama statute that allowed nonsectarian,
nonproselytizing student-initiated prayer at school-related events).
74. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
75. Id. at 580.
76. Id. at 581.
77. Id.
78. Id. The pamphlet recommended that public prayers at nonsecretarian civic
ceremonies be inclusive and sensitive. Id. However, the pamphlet acknowledged that
"'[pirayer of any kind may be inappropriate on some civic occasions."' Id. Justice
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Pursuant to this policy, Rabbi Leslie Gutterman delivered both an
invocation and a benediction during the graduation ceremony for the
Nathan Bishop Middle School.79 As a result, Daniel Weisman, the
parent of a student participating in the graduation ceremony, sought
to bar Providence public school officials from inviting clergy to deliver
invocations and benedictions at any future public school
graduation.80  The Court held that state officials "directed the
performance of a formal religious exercise" during the graduation
Kennedy concluded that the principals "directed and controlled the content of the
prayer" by disseminating these pamphlets. See Kevin E. Broyles, Recent
Development, Establishment of Religion and High School Graduation Ceremonies: Lee v.
Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992), 16 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL'Y 279, 281 (1993) (arguing
that the Weisman decision does little to alleviate existing confusion between the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses).
79. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 581, 584.
The rabbi's invocation read as follows:
"INVOCATION
"God of the Free, Hope of the Brave:
"For the legacy of America where diversity is celebrated and the rights of
minorities are protected, we thank You. May these young men and women
grow up to enrich it. For the liberty of America, we thank You. May these
new graduates grow up to guard it.
"For the political process of America in which all its citizens may participate,
for its court system where all may seek justice we thank You. May those we
honor this morning always turn to it in trust.
"For the destiny of America we thank You. May the graduates of Nathan
Bishop Middle School so live that they might help to share it.
"May our aspirations for our country and for these young people, who are our
hope for the future, be richly fulfilled.
AMEN"
Id. at 581-82.
The rabbi's benediction read as follows:
"BENEDICTION
"0 God, we are grateful to You for having endowed us with the capacity for
learning which we have celebrated on this joyous commencement.
"Happy families give thanks for seeing their children achieve an important
milestone. Send Your blessings upon the teachers and administrators who
helped prepare them.
'"The graduates now need strength and guidance for the future, help them to
understand that we are not complete with academic knowledge alone. We
must each strive to fulfill what You require of us all: To do justly, to love
mercy, to walk humbly.
"We give thanks to You, Lord, for keeping us alive, sustaining us and
allowing us to reach this special, happy occasion.
AMEN"
Id. at 582.
80. Id. at 584. The Court found it unnecessary to address the alleged standing
issue because the daughter, Deborah Weisman, was enrolled in a Providence high
school and, with all certainty, would have an invocation and benediction read at her
high school graduation. Id.
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ceremony.
The Court interpreted the Constitution to guarantee that the
government will not coerce a person into participating in religious
exercises.82  Further, the Court found that the school district's
supervision of a public school graduation placed considerable public
and peer pressure on the attending students to stand as a group or
to maintain respectful silence during the invocation. 3 As such, for
many of the students at the graduation the act of standing or
remaining silent constituted participation in the rabbi's prayer.8 4 The
Court found that the State may not contravene the Establishment
Clause and place school children in this position.
85
Although the parties stipulated that the graduation and
promotional ceremonies were voluntary, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that "the Constitution forbids the State to exact
religious conformity from a student as the price of attending her
own... graduation."6 The "State ha[d] in every practical sense
compelled attendance and participation in an explicit religious
exercise at an event of singular importance to every student, one the
objecting student had no real alternative to avoid." 87  "[Tihe
conformity required of the student... was too high an exaction to
withstand the test of the Establishment Clause. ' 88 Accordingly, the
Court held that the Establishment Clause forbids clergy members
from offering prayers as part of an official school graduation
ceremony because students cannot be compelled to participate in
religious exercises. 89
81. Id. at 586.
82. Id. at 587. Such coercion is particularly dangerous when it "'establishes a
[state] religion or religious faith or tends to do so."' Id. (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).
83. Id. at 593; see also Broyles, supra note 78, at 282 (classifying this argument as
a "new psychological test of coercion" within First Amendment Establishment Clause
jurisprudence); Paula Savage Cohen, Comment, Psycho-Coercion, A New
Establishment Clause Test: Lee v. Weisman and Its Initial Effect, 73 B.U. L. REV. 501,
512 (1993) (observing the Court's comparison of the psychological coercion found in
graduation ceremonies with that of coercion found in classroom prayers).
84. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 593. The Court decided that this pressure could lead a
reasonable student dissenter to believe that standing up or remaining silent signified
approval of the religious exercise. Id. (recognizing that dissenters are not comforted
by the argument that the act of standing or remaining silent signifies respect, rather
than participation).
85. Id. (noting that adolescents are susceptible to peer pressure). Contra Cohen,
supra note 83, at 518 (contending that the Weisman Court failed to consider the age
and maturity of graduating seniors).
86. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 594, 596 (finding the parties stipulated in the district
court "that attendance at graduation and promotional ceremonies is voluntary").
87. Id. at 598.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 599; see also Broyles, supra note 78, at 286 (saying that Weisman
reaffirms "the dominant Supreme Court approach" to constitutional interpretation);
20011 881
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C. A Review of Fifth Circuit Law Prior to Santa Fe
1. Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District (Clear Creek I)
On the same day that the Supreme Court decided Lee v. Weisman,
it vacated and remanded Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School
District,9 0  wherein the Fifth Circuit upheld student-initiated
graduation prayer.9' The Clear Creek Independent School District
traditionally allowed graduating students to include and present
voluntarily written invocations and benedictions in the graduation
ceremony.9 2  Two students challenged this tradition by filing a
lawsuit that alleged Clear Creek's policies and actions violated the
Establishment Clause.9
Before the district court tried the case, Clear Creek's Board of
Trustees adopted an express resolution that formally reduced this
tradition to writing.9 4 The district court found that the school's
written policy, which permitted only nonsectarian and
nonproselytizing prayer, did not violate the Establishment Clause.9 5
Therefore, the district court granted summary judgment for Clear
Marjorie A. Silver, Rethinking Religion and Public School Education, 15 QUINNIPiAC L.
REV. 213, 214 (1995) (asserting that Weisman reaffirms the Engel and Schempp
decisions). Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and
Thomas, wrote a dissenting opinion, which contended that "prayer has been a
prominent part of government ceremonies and proclamations." Id. at 633 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). They further argued that "[voluntary prayer at graduation-a one-time
ceremony at which parents, friends, and relatives are present-can hardly ... raise
the same concerns" as school prayer. Id. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent
concluded that the majority's policy is as "senseless... as it is unsupported in law."
Id. at 646 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Cohen, supra note 83, at 516 (arguing that
the Weisman majority ignored prior Establishment Clause jurisprudence and,
instead, adopted a vague and confusing psycho-coercion test); Brook Millard, Note,
Lee v. Weisman and the Majoritarian Implications of Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence, 71 DENV. U. L. REv. 759, 773-74 (1994) (criticizing the Coercion Test
as fundamentally flawed because it is result-oriented and furthers majority control of
the community).
90. 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, vacated, and remanded, 505 U.S.
1215 (1992) (Clear Creek 1).
91. Id. at 424.
92. Id. at 417.
93. Id. (noting that the school district let students recite "traditional Christian"
prayers).
94. Id. The Resolution provides:
1. The use of an invocation and/or benediction at high school graduation exercise
shall rest within the discretion of the graduating senior class, with the advice and
counsel of the senior class principal;
2. The invocation and benediction, if used, shall be given by a student volunteer; and
3. Consistent with the principal of equal liberty of conscience, the invocation and
benediction shall be nonsectarian and nonproselytizing in nature.
Id.
95. Id. at 417-18.
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Creek 9  The plaintiffs appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals."
The Court of Appeals applied the three-pronged Lemon Test,
affirmed the decision of the district court, and found that Clear
Creek's tradition of student-initiated prayer did not violate the
Establishment Clause.98 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
specifically found that the resolution had a secular purpose, 99 did not
have a primary effect of advancing religion,' 0 and failed to entangle
government and religion excessively.'"' The Supreme Court granted
certiorari, 0 2 and held that the inclusion of prayers by clergy members
at the school graduation ceremony violated the Establishment
Clause.'0 3  The Court remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit for
further consideration.
0 4
2. Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District (Clear Creek II)
On remand, the Fifth Circuit, in Jones v. Clear Creek Independent
School District (Clear Creek II),10 5 maintained the position that the
school district's prayer policy had the primary secular purpose of
solemnizing graduation ceremonies and did not have the primary
effect of advancing religion.'06 The Fifth Circuit also held that the
96. Id. at 418.
97. Id. at 417.
98. Id. at 423.
99. Id. at 419-21 (describing the secular purpose as solemnizing graduation
ceremonies).
100. Id. at 421-22 (noting Clear Creek's passive role in the recitation of invocations
and concluding that the invocations enhanced the meaning of the graduation while
minimizing government endorsement of religion).
101. Id. at 422-23 (explaining that excessive entanglement is impossible because
the invocations are nonsectarian and the students write and present the invocations).
102. Jones v. Clear Creek Ind. Sch. Dist., 505 U.S. 1215, 1215 (1992) (Clear Creek
).
103. Id.
104. Id. ('The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of Lee v.
Weisman.").
105. 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), reh'g denied, 983 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 508 U.S. 967 (1993) (Clear Creek II).
106. Id. at 966-67 (finding that a graduation ceremony "can provide
encouragement to finish school and the inspiration and self-assurance necessary to
achieve after graduation, which are secular objectives"). Religion will only be
advanced if it attempts to attract new believers or increase the faith of the faithful.
See id. at 967. Contra Allan Gordus, Note, The Establishment Clause and Prayers in
Public High School Graduations: Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District, 47
ARK. L. REv 653, 668, 672 (1994) (submitting that the Resolution was
unconstitutional because it purposely introduced prayer and religion at graduation
exercises and had the primary effect of advancing religion because prayer can only
have a religious effect); Loeb, supra note 30, at 1323 (arguing that the Fifth Circuit's
finding that the resolution did not advance prayer contradicted the Weisman
decision).
Catholic University Law Review
tradition did not constitute excessive entanglement through its yearly
review of "unsolicited material for sectarianism and proselytization"
because the resolution did not involve Clear Creek with religious
institutions. 
0 7
Further, the tradition did not constitute an unconstitutional
government endorsement of religion because it merely permitted an
invocation if the graduating seniors chose to have one.' " Moreover,
the tradition did not unconstitutionally coerce students because it
did not force objectors to participate.'09 The Fifth Circuit noted that
these graduation prayers placed less psychological pressure on the
students than the prayers at issue in Weisman because all students
participated in the decision of whether to pray, and the prayers are
presented by a peer who, in the court's view, is less likely to coerce
participation than a government official or member of the clergy." 0
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held that the Weisman decision,
although similar, did not render Clear Creek's invocation policy
unconstitutional because Clear Creek's policy involved student-
initiated prayer.' The Supreme Court's denial of a subsequent writ
of certiorari let the Fifth Circuit's decision to permit student-initiated
prayer at public school ceremonies stand.
1 2
107. Clear Creek II, 977 F.2d at 967-68. Contra Gordus, supra note 106, at 674-75
(asserting that Clear Creek is entangled in the affairs of religion); Loeb, supra note 30,
at 1324 (pointing out that the Fifth Circuit later ruled that government involvement
in determining whether prayer was nonsectarian and nonproselytizing constituted
excessive entanglement).
108. See Clear Creek H1, 977 F.2d at 968. But see Gordus, supra note 106, at 680
(asserting that the Clear Creek's restrictions on student speech constitutes
government involvement and consequently, violates the Endorsement Test); Loeb,
supra note 30, at 1325 (claiming that the Fifth Circuit ignored the strong involvement
by the states in public school graduation ceremonies).
109. See Clear Creek II, 977 F.2d at 971-72 (saying that the "coercive effect of any
prayer permitted by the Resolution is more analogous to the innocuous 'God save the
United States and this Honorable Court' stated by and to adults than the
government-mandated message" in Weisman). But see Gordus, supra note 106, at
688 (concluding that prayers given pursuant to the Resolution violated the Coercion
Test).
110. Clear Creek II, 977 F.2d at 971 (mentioning that graduating seniors "'are less
impressionable than younger students"').
I 11. Id. at 971-72.
112. Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 967 (1993). But see Loeb,
supra note 30, at 1325-32 (concluding that the Fifth Circuit's decision was misguided
because the Court failed to focus on the coercive nature of the event and arguing that
all prayer at graduation services is unconstitutionally coercive because students are
coerced into attending graduations). In contrast to the Fifth Circuit's Clear Creek II
decision, the Third and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals found that giving students
control of prayers during graduation ceremonies was not enough to satisfy
constitutional scrutiny. See McCarthy, supra note 42, at 141 & nn. 121&122 (citing
ACLU v. Blackhorse Pike Regional Board of Education, 84 F.3d 1471, 1477 (3d Cir.
1996), which declared that "'an impermissible practice cannot be transformed into a
constitutionally acceptable one by putting a democratic process to an improper use"';
and Harris v. Joint School District, 41 F.3d 447, 452 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated, 515
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II. SANTA FE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT V. DOE: THE NEXT STEP IN
LIMITING PRAYER IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
A. The Facts
For an unknown period of time prior to and including the 1992-
1993 and 1993-1994 school years, the Santa Fe Independent School
District allowed students to read Christian prayers at all graduation
ceremonies and home varsity football games. 113  The student
chaplain, who is elected by the school's student council, typically
delivered the prayers before each of these events. 114
In April 1995, two sets of current and former students and their
mothers 115 sought a temporary restraining order to prevent student-
led prayers during the graduation ceremony."' 6 In addition to the
prospective injunctive and declaratory relief, the families also sought
money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.117
On May 10, 1995, the district court entered an interim order
permitting a senior student or students chosen by the senior class to
give a "'non-denominational prayer' during the graduation
ceremony." 8  Students, without the oversight of school officials,
U.S. 154 (1995), which reiterated that there is "no meaningful distinction between
school authorities actually organizing the religious activity and officials merely
[allowing] students to direct the exercises").
113. Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 810 (5th Cir. 1999), reh'g en
banc denied, 171 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), affd, 530 U.S. 290, 317
(2000). The Santa Fe Independent School District is a political subdivision in Texas.
Id. at 809.
114. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294 (2000).
115. Id. 'The District Court permitted respondents (Doe's) to litigate anonymously
in an effort to protect them from intimidation or harassment." Id. That these parties
were allowed to litigate anonymously caused quite a controversy. Id. at 294-95 n. 1.
116. Id. at 295. The complaint asserted several claims against the District. Id.
First, the families claimed that the District used several proselytizing practices,
including "promoting attendance at a Baptist revival meeting, encouraging
membership in religious clubs, chastising children who held minority religious
beliefs, and distributing Gideon Bibles on school premises." Id. Second, the families
alleged that the District allowed the reading of Christian invocations and benedictions
at graduation ceremonies and permitted students to deliver prayers before football
games over the public address system. "Id.
117. Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 811. Section 1983 provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any
Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered
to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
118. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 295-96.
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would prepare the contents of the prayer. 119  The prayer could
reference religious figures as Mohammed, Jesus, Buddha, or the like,
if the "'thrust of the prayer [was] non-proselytizing.""2
The District responded to the court's order by adopting a series of
policies that dealt with prayer at school functions.' 21 One particular
policy allowed the graduating seniors to vote on whether to have
"nonsectarian, nonproselytizing" invocations and benedictions at
their graduation ceremony. 2 2  In July 1995, however, the District
eliminated the requirement that these invocations and benedictions
be nonsectarian and nonproselytizing.
2 3
In addition, the District enacted a policy in August 1995, which
addressed prayer before high school varsity football games.124 This
"Prayer at Football Games" policy authorized two student elections.
25
The first election determined whether students would deliver
invocations before football games. 126 The second election selected the
student who would give the invocation.12 7 The policy did not require
the invocation to be nonsectarian and nonproselytizing; however, the
policy contained a fallback provision, which automatically required
"nonsectarian and nonproselytizing" prayer if the district court
enjoined the District's newly adopted policy. 128
119. Id. at 296 (noting that school officials would neither scrutinize nor preapprove
the text of the prayers).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 296-97. The "emergency response" policy provided:
The Board has chosen to permit the graduating senior class, with the advice
and counsel of the senior class principal or designee, to elect by secret ballot
to choose whether an invocation and benediction shall be a part of the
graduation exercise. If so chosen the class shall elect by secret ballot, from a
list of student volunteers, students to deliver nonsectarian, nonproselytizing
invocations and benedictions for the purpose of solemnizing their graduation
ceremonies.
Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 811-12 (5th Cir. 1999), reh'g en
banc denied, 171 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), affd, 530 U.S. 290, 317
(2000) (citing Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992)).
123. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 297. The policy did state that if the District were to be
enjoined from enforcing this new policy, the May 1995, policy would automatically
take effect. Id.
124. Id. at 297-98. This prayer policy permitted a student-selected, student-given
"'brief invocation and/or message to be delivered during the pre-game ceremonies of
home varsity football games to solemnize the event, to promote good sportsmanship
and student safety, and to establish the appropriate environment for the
competition."' Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 812.
125. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 297.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 297-98 (noting, however, that the District's preferred practice did not
require "nonsectarian and nonproselytizing" prayer).
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The District passed another policy in October 1995.129 This "final
policy" essentially mirrored the August 1995 policy regarding prayer
at football games, except that it omitted the word "prayer" from the
title and replaced it with the words "messages," "statements," and
"invocations." 3 ' The Supreme Court's Santa Fe decision caused a
constitutional earthquake, which centered on the validity of this final
policy. 131
B. The Santa Fe Majority Holding
The Santa Fe Court invalidated the District's policy of permitting
student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games because it
violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.1 32 The
Court declared the policy "invalid on its face" because it established a
129. Id. at 298 (classifying this latest policy as "the final policy").
130. Id. The final policy, in its entirety, provides:
STUDENT ACTIVITIES:
PRE-GAME CEREMONIES AT FOOTBALL GAMES
The board has chosen to permit students to deliver a brief invocation and/or
message to be delivered during the pre-game ceremonies of home varsity
football games to solemnize the event, to promote good sportsmanship and
student safety, and to establish the appropriate environment for competition.
Upon advice and direction of the high school principal, each spring, the high
school student council shall conduct an election, by the high school student
body, by secret ballot, to determine whether such a statement or invocation
will be part of the pre-game ceremonies and if so, shall elect a student, from
a list of student volunteers, to deliver the statement or invocation. The
student volunteer who is selected by his or her classmates may decide what
message and/or invocation to deliver, consistent with the goals and purposes
of this policy.
If the District is enjoined by a court order from the enforcement of this policy,
then and only then will the following policy automatically become the
applicable policy of the school district.
The board has chosen to permit students to deliver a brief invocation and/or
message to be delivered during the pre-game ceremonies of home varsity
football games to solemnize the event, to promote good sportsmanship and
student safety, and to establish the appropriate environment for the
competition.
Upon advice and direction of the high school principal, each spring, the high
school student council shall conduct an election, by the high school student
body, by secret ballot, to determine whether such a statement or invocation
will be part of the pre-game ceremonies and if so, shall elect a student, from
a list of student volunteers, to deliver the statement or invocation. The
student volunteer who is selected by his or her classmates may decide what
statement or invocation to deliver, consistent with the goals and purposes of
this policy. Any message and/or invocation delivered by a student must be
nonsectarian and nonproselytizing.
Id. at 298-99.
131. Id. at 298.
132. Id. at 317 (concluding that the District's prayer policy did not create a
constitutional safe harbor).
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majoritarian election on religion and created the perception of
encouraging prayer at important school events. 133
The majority opinion, which Justice Stevens wrote, rejected the
argument that the policy should survive constitutional scrutiny
because the prayer messages constituted private student speech, not
public speech.' 34 The Court further found that the prayer messages
amounted to public speech because the invocations took place on
government property during government-sponsored events, and were
authorized specifically by a government policy. '35  The Court
specifically noted that the policy constituted public speech because it
prevented arbitrary use by the student body and its regulations
limited the topic and content of the message.' 36  The Court
specifically criticized the District's policy because it ensured that only
those messages that the District found "appropriate" could be
delivered. 37
The Court next discussed the effects of the District's prayer policy
upon the minority student population.'3 8 The Court found that while
the election process might guarantee that a majority of students
receive representation, the policy did nothing to protect the minority,
133. Id. (affirming the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals).
134. Id. at 302. Justice Stevens did acknowledge the distinction between
government speech that endorses religion, which is not allowed by the Establishment
Clause, and private speech that endorses religion, which the Establishment Clause
authorizes. Id. (citing Board of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S.
226, 250 (1990) (O'Connor, J., plurality)).
135. Id. The Supreme Court noted that an individual's contribution to a
government-created forum does not constitute government speech. Id. (citing
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995)). For more
information on the significance of the fact that activity took place on government
property see Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995)
(discussing the "traditional public forum" doctrine); Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (discussing the "limited public
forum" doctrine); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (discussing the "limited
public forum" doctrine). The Court found, however, that the District failed to actually
argue that the pregame ceremony constituted a forum that would allow religious
speech. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 303 n. 12. Even if it were found that the District
created a public forum, the Court noted that the Supreme Court has never held that
the simple creation of a public forum protects the government from Establishment
Clause scrutiny. Id. at 303 n. 13 (citing Pinette, 515 U.S. at 772 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
136. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 302-03 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484
U.S. 260, 270 (1988)). The Court compared this case to its decision in Perry
Educational Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37 (1983), where the
Court rejected a claim that a school created a limited public forum in its mail system,
although the system allowed for more speakers and a broader range of topics than
the policy adopted by the Santa Fe School District. Id. "'[Slelective access does not
transform government property into a public forum."' Id. (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at
47).
137. Id. at 304.
138. Id. at 304-06 (referring to students whose viewpoints are among the minority,
not necessarily racial or ethnic minorities).
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and therefore, placed them at the mercy of the majority's decisions. 39
The Court determined that the District's policy regarding student
elections inadequately safeguarded diverse student speech "[blecause
'fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on
the outcome of no elections[.]
' ' '
"
40
The Court remarked that, in cases involving state participation in
religious activity, it was relevant to ask whether an objective
individual, familiar with a statute's text, legislative history, and
implementation, would perceive the state policy as an endorsement
of prayer in public schools.' 4' Although the District claimed no part
in promoting student-initiated pre-football game prayers, the Santa
Fe Court found that in reality, the District's policy involved both a
perceived an actual endorsement of religion.' 2 The Court reached
this conclusion by examining the text and history of the policy, which
indicated that the policy's purpose included allowing prayer as a part
of the pregame football ceremony.13
139. Id. at 304.
140. Id. at 304-05 (quoting West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
638 (1943)).
141. Id. at 308 ("Regardless of the listener's support for, or objection to, the
message, an objective Santa Fe High School student will unquestionably perceive the
inevitable pregame prayer as stamped with her school's seal of approval.").
142. See id. at 305-07. The Court specifically noted:
The District has attempted to disentangle itself from the religious messages
by developing the two-step student election process ... . [However, tihe
results of the elections ... make it clear that the students understood the
central question before them was whether prayer should be a part of the
pregame ceremony. We recognize the important role that public worship
plays in many communities, as well as the sincere desire to include public
prayer as a part of various occasions so as to mark those occasions'
significance. But such religious activity in public schools, as elsewhere,
must comport with the First Amendment.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
143. See id. at 307-08. The District argued that the secular purposes for the policy
included fostering free expression of private persons, solemnizing sporting events,
promoting good sportsmanship and safety, and establishing an appropriate
environment for competition. Id. at 309. The Court rejected these purposes and
stated that the District's approval of an "invocation" was not necessary to further any
of the proposed purposes. Id. The Court also commented that the delivery of a
content-limited message did little to advance free expression. Id. Given the history of
"regular delivery of a student-led prayer at athletic events," it is reasonable to infer
that the purpose of the prayer policy "preserve[d] a popular 'state-sponsored religious
practice."' Id. (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596 (1992)).
Moreover, the Court pointed to factors beyond the text of the policy to establish the
actual or perceived endorsement of the message by the District. Id. at 307. These
factors included: the invocation was delivered to an audience gathered as part of a
regularly scheduled, school-sponsored event conducted on school property; the
prayer was delivered over the school's public address system; the football team,
cheerleaders, and band members were dressed in uniforms adorning the school name
and mascot; the school's name was printed across the field, banners, and flags; and
the crowd was also dressed in attire supporting the school. Id. at 307-08.
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The Santa Fe Court then confronted the argument that no
impermissible government coercion took place because the students
delivered the pregame messages and they voluntarily attended the
football games. 4  Although the students ultimately chose the
student speaker under the policy, the Court attributed the District's
decision to hold the election to the State. 45 The Court determined
that this decision encouraged religious divisions in a public school
setting, and that this result contravened the Establishment Clause. 146
Regarding voluntary attendance at football games, the Court
simply stated that the Constitution forbids the District from exacting
religious conformity from a student as a condition of attending a
varsity football game.' 47 In addition, although the Establishment and
Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment prevent the
government from passing laws that establish a religion or prohibit
the free exercise of religion, the Court pointed out that not all
religious activity is prohibited in public schools. 48  Accordingly,
"nothing in the Constitution as interpreted by this Court prohibits
any public school student from voluntarily praying at any time
before, during, or after the schoolday." 49  However, this prayer
144. See id. at 310 (articulating the District's argument that attempted to
distinguish this case from Weisman).
145. Id. at 311 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992)).
146. Id. at 311-12.
147. Id. at 312-13. The Court stated:
Even if we regard every high school student's decision to attend a home
football game as purely voluntary, we are nevertheless persuaded that the
delivery of a pregame prayer has the improper effect of coercing those present
to participate in an act of religious worship. For "the government may no
more use social pressure to enforce orthodoxy than it may use more direct
means." As in Lee [v. Weisman], "[wlhat to most believers may seem nothing
more than a reasonable request that the nonbeliever respect their religious
practices, in a school context may appear to the nonbeliever or dissenter to
be an attempt to employ machinery of the State to enforce a religious
orthodoxy."
Id. at 312 (internal citations omitted).
148. Id. at 313 (citing Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508
U.S. 384, 395 (1993); Board of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S.
226 (1990) (O'Connor, J., plurality); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59 (1985)).
149. Id. This statement is in accord with the 1984 Equal Access to Facilities Act.
20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (1994). This Act, in pertinent part, states:
It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which receives Federal
financial assistance and which has a limited open forum to deny equal
access or a fair opportunity to, or discriminate against, any students who
wish to conduct a meeting within that limited open forum on the basis of the
religious, political, philosophical, or other content of the speech at such
meetings.
20 U.S.C. § 4071(a). Accordingly, the Act requires that public schools allow religious
clubs and organizations the same access to their facilities as secular clubs and
organizations. See Silver, supra note 89, at 221 (assessing the religious discord
found in schools and communities). The Supreme Court sustained the
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cannot be state-sponsored.1 5 0
Finally, the Court rejected the District's claim that the families
prematurely challenged the facial validity of the prayer policy.15 1 In
rather shocking rhetoric, the Court described the case as "the latest
step in developing litigation ... to [challenge] institutional practices
that unquestionably violated the Establishment Clause." 52 Further,
the Court refused "to turn a blind eye" to the context in which the
policy arose.1
53
The District argued that until a student actually delivers a prayer
pursuant to the policy, there is no certainty that any of the
statements or invocations will be religious. 154 Although the Court
agreed with this argument, the Court disagreed with the argument
that the 5policy necessarily survives a facial challenge on two
grounds. 5 First, by simply enacting the policy, the District violated
the Constitution because the policy endorsed student prayer.156
Accordingly, a student does not need to actually recite a prayer for a
constitutional violation to occur.'57 Second, the Court stated that the
policy is facially invalid because it impermissibly imposed a
majoritarian election on the issue of prayer upon the student body. 8
constitutionality of the Act in Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v.
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 253 (1990) (O'Connor, J., plurality). In Mergens, a group of
high school students sought the formation of a Christian club that would have met
after school hours on school premises. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 231-32. The club's
purpose was to permit students to read and discuss the Bible, to promote fellowship,
and to pray together. Id. at 232. Membership in the club was to be voluntary and
open to all students, regardless of religious affiliation. Id. School officials denied the
requests because they thought a religious club at the school would violate the
Establishment Clause. Id. at 232-33. The Supreme Court held that because the high
school maintained a "limited open forum" under the Equal Access to Facilities Act, it
could not discriminate against students who wished to hold a meeting after school
based upon the content of their speech. Id. at 246-47. Accordingly, the Act did not,
on its face, violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 253.
150. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 313 (stating specifically that religious liberty is
abridged when the state affirmatively sponsors a particular practice of prayer); see
also generally Wallace, 472 U.S. at 38; Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
151. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 313.
152. Id. at 315.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 313.
155. See id. at 313, 316-17.
156. Id. 316.
157. See id. (finding that the policy nevertheless fails a facial constitutional
challenge because the District sought to endorse religion).
158. Id. The Court elaborated:
Through its election scheme, the District has established a governmental
electoral mechanism that turns the school into a forum for religious debate.
It further empowers the student body majority with the authority to subject
students of minority views to constitutionally improper messages. The award
of that power alone, regardless of the students' ultimate use of it, is not
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Consequently, the Court invalidated the policy on its face because it
encouraged prayer at important high school events and established
an improper majoritarian election on religion.15 9
C. The Santa Fe Dissenting Opinion
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the dissent, proclaimed that
the majority "distort[edl existing precedent to conclude that the
school district's student-message program [was] invalid on its face
under the Establishment Clause.",160 The Chief Justice found the
tone of the majority's opinion even more disturbing because it
bristled "with hostility to all things religious in public life."' 6 1 The
Chief Justice quoted George Washington and argued that neither the
holding nor the tone of the majority opinion followed prior
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority decision to strike
down the policy even though the District had not implemented its
policy.' 63 He further explained that the question was not whether the
policy could violate the Establishment Clause, but whether the policy
inevitably violates the Establishment Clause.164  Accordingly, he
criticized harshly the Court's decision to enter "the realm of
prophecy."
65
acceptable.
Id. & n.23.
159. See id. at 317.
160. Id. at 318 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
161. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also Editorial, Tolerance Is Essential
Where State and Religious Interests Overlap, TAMPA TRIB. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1999, at 2
(arguing that the government "has become less tolerant and... unconstitutionally
hostile" toward the expression of higher loyalties at government-sponsored events).
Contra The Supreme Court, 1999 Term-Leading Cases, 114 HARV. L. REV. 249, 258-
59 (2000) (asserting that the Court is attempting to foster religious plurality rather
than favoring the secular over the religious) [hereinafter Leading Cases]; Steve
Kloehn, High Court Treads Ever So Lightly on Prayer... Again, CHI. TRIB., June 23,
2000, at 2 (characterizing the majority decision bristles with "an acute state of
nervous sensitivity" rather than hostility).
162. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 318 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). At the request of the
Congress that passed the Bill of Rights, George Washington proclaimed a day of
"'public thanksgiving and prayer, to be observed by acknowledging with grateful
hearts the many and signal favors of Almighty God .... " A NATIONAL THANKSGIVING, 1
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1902, at 64 (James D. Richardson ed.
1903). Moreover, one of the first acts of the First Congress was the hiring of'a
chaplain. See George F. Will, Editorial, Fumble on Prayer, WASH. POST, June 21,
2000, at A23 (strongly criticizing the Santa Fe opinion).
163. Santa Fe, 530 at 318 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). (quoting United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987), to say that just because a policy "might 'operate
unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to
render it wholly invalid').
164. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 319 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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The Chief Justice also criticized the majority's application of "the
most rigid version of the oft-criticized" Lemon Test. Moreover, the
dissent asserted that even if it were appropriate to apply the Lemon
Test, the majority incorrectly found the policy invalid on its face. 67
First, the dissent posited that the majority "misconstrue[d] the
nature of the 'majoritarian election' permitted by the policy as... an
election on 'prayer' and 'religion."' 68 Several possibilities existed,
which led the dissent to believe that the two-fold student election
would not produce an "invocation" before football games.1
6 9
Nevertheless, the majority ignored these alternatives and found that
the District improperly granted the student body the ability to elect a
speaker, who may choose to pray.170
Second, the Dissent contended that the District's policy had
plausible secular purposes of solemnizing the events, promoting good
sportsmanship and student safety, and establishing the appropriate
environment for the competition. I The dissent also noted that when
"a government body 'expresses a plausible secular purpose' for an
enactment [of a policy], 'courts should generally defer to that
statement of intent."172 The dissent proclaimed that the majority
opinion "grant[ed] no deference to-and appear[ed] openly hostile
toward-the policy's stated purposes, and wastes no time in
concluding that they are a sham."
Finally, the dissent criticized the Court's "new requirement" that
demanded a government policy be completely content neutral to pass
constitutional scrutiny. Arguing that Establishment Clause
jurisprudence does not require complete "content neutrality" as the
166. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing the checkered history of the Lemon
decision and noting the Court's willingness to find the Lemon decision nonbinding).
167. Id. at 320 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (saying that the majority "misse[d] the
mark").
168. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 320-21 (Rehnquist, C.A., dissenting). Such possibilities included the
possibility that the students might vote not to have a pregame speaker, which would
provide no threat of a constitutional violation. Id. at 321 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
170. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for failing to consider
that a speech may constitute private, not public speech).
171. Id. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the Establishment Clause
does not prohibit students from solemnizing events).
172. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 74-75
(1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring)); see also Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586-
87 (1987) (noting the Court's normal deferential posture regarding a state's
articulation of a secular purpose); Gordus, supra note 106, at 666 (commenting that
the Supreme Court has directed courts to defer substantially to the government's
stated purpose).
173. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 325 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (observing that "content neutrality" Is
found in First Amendment speech cases and is used to determine the application of
strict scrutiny).
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majority demanded, the dissent asserted that school's do not violate
the First Amendment every time they restrict student speech to
certain categories. 175 The dissent lamented that a school policy,
which allows the student body president to solemnize a graduation
ceremony by giving a favorable introduction to a guest speaker,
would be facially unconstitutional because the majority believes that
all solemnization promotes prayer.171
11. SANTA FE V. DOE: INCORRECTLY APPLYING CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE AND OPENING THE DOOR TO NEW CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES
A. The Incorrect Use of Prior Establishment Clause Jurisprudence To
Strike Down Student-Initiated, Student-Led Prayer
1. Incorrectly Characterizing the District Policy as a Violation of the
Endorsement Test
The Endorsement Test prohibits the government from "endorsing,"
"favoring," "preferring," or "promoting" one religious belief over
another. 77 In striking down the District's prayer policy as a violation
of the Establishment Clause, the Court proclaimed boldly that
"[clontrary to the District's repeated assertions that it has adopted a
'hands-off approach to the pregame invocation, the realities of the
situation plainly reveal that its policy involves both a perceived and
an actual endorsement of religion.'17 The Court based this
statement on a finding that the school involved itself in the selection
of the student speaker, who the school invites and encourages to give
a religious message. 179 Although the students were asked simply to
vote on whether to have a student speaker before football games and
who that speaker would be, the Court found that "the students
understood that the central question before them was whether prayer
should be a part of the pregame ceremony." 8 ° The Court placed
particular importance on the fact that students delivered the
invocation over the school's public address system, during a school
function, and on school property. 8 Consequently, the majority
determined that an objective high school student would perceive the
175. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 325-26 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The majority states that
solemnization "invites and encourages religious messages." Id. at 306.
177. Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593-94 (1989).
178. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 305.
179. Id. at 305-06 (recognizing that the policy intended to solemnize the event and
arguing that solemnization is most obviously accomplished through the recitation of a
religious message).
180. Id. at 306-07.
181. Id.
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pregame invocation as "stamped" with the school's approval. 182
However, the majority determined incorrectly that the District's
prayer policy endorses religion. 8 3 As the dissent correctly stated, the
majority misconstrued the nature of the District's prayer policy as an
election on "prayer" and "religion." 18 4 The District created a two-fold
process that allowed students to choose whether there would be a
speaker before football games. 185 If the students chose to have a
speaker, then they would vote on who that speaker would be; as
such, it was conceivable that the students could have chosen not to
have a speaker at all. 8 6 The majority viewed this two-step process as
an attempt by the District to distance itself from a decision to
support school prayer. 18 7 The policy, however, provided no guidance
on the content of a student speaker's speech beyond allowing the
student to briefly solemnize the event.1
8
Although the majority claimed that a "religious message is the
most obvious method of solemnizing the event,"'8 9 the dissent
correctly observed that many solemn messages are not religious in
nature.'9° In these situations, no threat of a constitutional violation
exists because the speech would not mention religion. '' The mere
possibility of including a religious message amidst several other
choices does not constitute state endorsement of religion. 92 Rather,
the state endorses religion as one possibility among several possible
forms of student speech. 193
Had the Court upheld the policy, a student, not the school, would
182. Id. at 308; see also Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court and Religious Liberty,
40 CATH. LAW. 25, 56 (2000) (hypothesizing that the majority found that the District's
policy "obviously" sponsored prayer).
183. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 320 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
184. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
185. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 321 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also Laycock, supra note 182, at
56. (observing the dissent's disagreement with the majority's premature assumption
that the policy would consistently lead to prayer).
187. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 305-06.
188. See Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 812 (5th Cir. 1999), reh'g
en banc denied, 171 F.3d 1013, 1014 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), affd, 530 U.S.
290, 317 (2000) (discussing the October 1995 policy).
189. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 306.
190. Id. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (saying that a message that urges that
a game be fairly fought is solemn, but not religious).
191. See id. at 321 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
192. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the majority disregards the
possibility that the student election may not focus on prayer); see also Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 630 n.8 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring) (proclaiming that "[ilf
the State had chosen its graduation day speakers according to wholly secular criteria,
and if one of those speakers (not a state actor) had individually chosen to deliver a
religious message, it would have been harder to attribute an endorsement of religion
to the State").
193. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 320-22 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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have selected and created the speech.'94 For example, the students
may have elected a speaker according to secular criteria, 195 but the
speaker, by his own accord, may have chosen to deliver a religious
message.' Most likely, this situation would have passed
constitutional scrutiny because the speech would have been private
speech initiated solely by the student, and not public speech that the
government initiated. 97 Accordingly, the District's policy would not
"endorse," "favor," "prefer," or "promote" a certain religious belief over
the belief of others. 
198
2. Erroneously Concluding That the District's Policy Violated the
Coercion Test
Pursuant to Lee v. Weisman, the Court analyzed school-sponsored
religious activity by determining a policy's coercive effect on
students.' 99 The Santa Fe Court found that the District's policy failed
194. Id. at 324 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (suggesting that the student speech
may have constituted private, not public speech).
195. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Examples of secular criteria include good
public speaking skills or social popularity. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
196. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
197. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). But cf. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
675, 685 (1986) (holding that the First Amendment does not protect offensive and
lewd speech given by a student at a school assembly). There is a "crucial difference
between government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause
forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free
Exercise Clauses protect." Board of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496
U.S. 226, 250 (1990). In Mergens, the Court noted that a school neither endorses nor
supports student speech that is permitted on a nondiscriminatory basis. See id.
(citing Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503
(1969), which found no danger that high school students' symbolic speech implied
school endorsement, and West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943), which held the same). When no formal classroom activities are
involved, and state officials fail to participate actively in the activities, there exists
little risk of coercion or official state endorsement of religion. Mergens, 496 U.S. at
251. Further, from the 1960s until the 1980s, student-initiated prayers during
school events were usually found in violation of the Establishment Clause.
McCarthy, supra note 42, at 139. In the 1990s, federal courts began to interpret
private speech more broadly and expanded the circumstances under which student-
initiated prayers were allowed in public education. Id. But see supra note 135, and
accompanying text.
198. See Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593-94 (1989). The Endorsement Test
fails to distinguish among those students alienated by the religious exercise and
those students excluded because of their religious practices. Leading Cases, supra
note 161, at 253-54. The Establishment Clause requires this result. Id. at 254. By
focusing solely on students who the religious exercise alienates, the Court disregards
the alienation felt by those students who regard the prayer exercise as an important
part of their public life. Id. Thus, the Court endorses secularism over religion. Id.
"[Tihe fact that students may sometimes feel like outsiders does not provide a secure
doctrinal foundation for the protection of the liberty and beliefs of students in the
religious minority." Id.
199. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 317. "[U]nconstitutional coercion [occurs] when: (1)
the government directs (2) a formal religious exercise (3) in such a way as to oblige
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the Coercion Test because it coerced students into participating in
"an act of religious worship."20 0  Although attendance at a football
game is voluntary for most students, the games are "traditional
gatherings" for the entire school community.20' The First Amendment
prohibits the school from making students choose between attending
football games or facing a potentially offensive religious worship.
0
.
The Court compared this case with Weisman and asserted that
"'[w]hat to most believers may seem nothing more than a reasonable
request that the non-believer respect their religious practices, in a
school context may appear to the nonbeliever or dissenter to be an
attempt to employ the machinery of the State to enforce a religious
orthodoxy.' 20 3  The Court, therefore, concluded that the District
could not require religious conformity from a student as the price for
204
attending a varsity football game.
The Court found the policy to be unconstitutionally coercive by
focusing on issues that should have allowed the policy to pass the
Coercion Test.2 05 First, attendance at a high school football game,
unlike class attendance, is not a graduation requirement.2 6 Second,
the Court conceded that the informal pressure on students to attend
a high school football game is not as strong as the pressure on
students to attend their school graduation ceremony, which was at
the heart of Lee v. Weisman.Y Unlike Weisman, the District's policy
did not compel student attendance and participation in an overtly
religious exercise at an event "of singular importance to every
the participation of objectors." Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963,
970 (5th Cir. 1992), reh'g denied, 983 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1992) (Clear Creek II).
Contra Leading Cases, supra note 161, at 255 (noting assertions that the Coercion
Test is structurally deficient and its expansion into physiological principles casts
doubt on its effectiveness).
200. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 312.
201. Id. at 311. Seasonal commitments mandate that football players,
cheerleaders, and band members attend the football games. Id. Interestingly
enough, the Court failed to recognize that the decision to be a cheerleader, band
member, or football team member is voluntary and not required for graduation. See
id.
202. Id. "'It is a tenant of the First Amendment that the State cannot require one of
its citizens to forfeit his or her rights and benefits. as the price of resisting
conformance to state-sponsored religious practice."' Id. (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577, 596 (1992)).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See id. at 311 (evaluating the District's argument that attendance at high
school football games is a "passing interest" and "decidedly extracurricular," and thus
dissipating coercion).
206. Id. (stating that attendance at varsity football games is "certainly not required
in order to receive a diploma").
207. Id. (assuming that informal pressure on a student to attend a school athletic
event is weaker than a student's desire to attend his or her graduation ceremony).
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student," like that of a graduation ceremony.
In addition, the Coercion Test contends that "unconstitutional
government coercion occurs when the government directs the
performance of a formal religious exercise and whenever those who
object to the exercise are [obligated] to participate." 20 9  When a
voluntary and neutral political process produces prayer, the norms of
the community, not the norms of the government, are reflected.21°
The District's policy created a two-pronged process whereby the
students, not the school, voted (1) on whether to have a speaker
before football games; and (2) who that speaker should be. 21' When a
community voluntarily engages in a vote or other political process
that ultimately produces prayer, the prayers are the initiative of the
212
community, and not the product of coercion by the government.
Accordingly, the District's policy did not constitute unconstitutional
coercion by the government.2 3
208. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598 (1992).
209. John P. Cronan, Note, A Political Process Argument for the Constitutionality of
Student-Led, Student-Initiated Prayer, 18 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 503, 510 (2000)
(arguing that the Supreme Court should reverse the Fifth Circuit's Santa Fe v. Doe
decision and affirm the constitutionality of student-initiated, student-led prayer by
applying a political process analysis of community norms).
210. Id.
211. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 320 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
212. See Cronan, supra note 209 (arguing that prayer produced by a political
process cannot violate the Coercion Test).
213. To strike down the District's policy as a violation of the Establishment Clause,
the Court rebutted the District's argument that the plaintiffs made a premature
challenge to the policy. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 313. The Court admitted that
unless a student delivered a message under the District's most recent policy, it
remained uncertain as to whether any "invocation" would be religious in nature. Id.
Although no "invocation" had actually been given pursuant to the policy, the Court
declared the policy unconstitutional "on its face" because it had the unquestionable
purpose and perception "of encouraging the delivery of prayer at a series of important
school events." Id. at 317. As the dissent correctly noted, the Court incorrectly
applied the Lemon Test to achieve the desired outcome. See id. at 319 (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting) (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)).
The Dissent noted Lemon's "checkered career in the decisional law of [the] Court."
Id.; Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671
(1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (deriding the "Sisyphean task of trying to patch
together the 'blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier' described in Lemon"); see also
Will, supra note 162, at A23 (arguing that the Santa Fe decision "lengthens the
[Clourt's meandering record of on-again, off-again, and occasionally partial,
adherence to" the Lemon Test). Moreover, the dissent accurately recognized that the
Court has gone even as far as to suggest that the Lemon Test is not binding. See
Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 319-20 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984)). "[W]e have repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness to be
confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area . . . . In two cases, the
Court did not even apply the Lemon 'test."' Lynch, 465 U.S. at 668.
In 1997, the Court exclusively referred to Lemon in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203
(1997), primarily to highlight problems with the Court's application of the Lemon Test
in two decisions rendered twelve years earlier. McCarthy, supra note 42, at 129
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B. Opening the Door to New Challenges Against State "Moment of
Silence Laws"
Although the Supreme Court struck down a "moment of silence"
law in Wallace v. Jaffree, many states have instituted laws permitting
or requiring students to spend time during the school day in silent
meditation. 14 Although a few statutes explicitly require students to
(citing Agostini, 521 U.S. at 218-20, but overturning Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 492
(1985) and School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985)). Instead of reaffirming the
three-part Lemon Test, the Court appeared to use the "excessive entanglement" prong
as a separate analytical tool. Id. (citing Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232-33). Moreover,
several lower courts have chosen not to rely solely on Lemon and have reviewed
government actions under a multitude of standards. See id. at 130. Some
commentators even say that Lemon has been discredited. Id.; see also Loeb, supra
note 30, at 1309 (noting that recent Supreme Court cases reveal that the Court has
distanced itself from the Lemon Test). Yet it is with Lemon that the Court finds the
District's policy facially unconstitutional. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 314. This
decision was misguided.
Even if it were appropriate to apply the Lemon Test to the District's policy, the dissent
properly concluded that the policy is not invalid on its face. See id. at 320
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Court held that the simple enactment of a policy
"with the purpose and perception of school endorsement of student prayer"
constituted a violation of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 316. The dissent,
however, found plausible secular purposes. Id. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
These purposes included solemnizing the event, promoting good sportsmanship and
student safety, and establishing the appropriate environment for competition. Id.;
see also, e.g., Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232, 236 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding
that nonsectarian prayers at school events had the secular purpose of dignifying and
memorializing a public occasion). Given that courts generally defer to the expressed
secular purpose of an enactment by a governmental body, the dissent properly found
in error the Court's decision to grant no deference to the District and the Court's
conclusion that the secular purposes were "a sham." See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 322
(Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 74-75 (1985)); see
also generally note 175 and accompanying text.
214. See Johnson, supra note 55, at 1019-20 (concluding that the Supreme Court
would uphold pure moment of silence statutes). A pure "moment of silence" statute
establishes a moment of silence without specifying in anyway that the moment is for
prayer. Id. at 1020 n.11.
Distinctions exist between organized prayer in schools and organized "moments of
silence." Silver, supra note 89, at 223. While officially mandated prayers are
unconstitutional, it is argued that officially mandated "moments of silence" that
create personal opportunities for prayer are allowable if religious neutrality is
maintained. Id. at 224. Dicta in the Court's opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree suggests
that moment of silence laws are constitutional. Id. at 224-25 & n.77 (citing Wallace
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59 (1985) and stating that "[tihe legislative intent to return
prayer to public schools is, of course, quite different from merely protecting every
student's right to engage in voluntary prayer during an appropriate moment of silence
during the schoolday"). Commentators claimed that so long as the "moments of
silence" are neutral towards prayer, the observation of the moment of silence is
constitutionally unobjectionable. Id. at 225. Contra 68 AM. JUR. 2D Schools § 358
(2000) (remarking that a state statute authorizing a one-minute "moment of silence,"
whose sole purpose is to return voluntary prayer to public schools, violates the
Establishment Clause even if the statute does not preference prayer over other forms
of silent activity).
Congress has attempted to pass a constitutional amendment allowing for school
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spend time in meditation, the majority of these statutes mandate a
moment of silence at the beginning of each school day for meditation,
215
reflection, or prayer.
Many of the lower courts that have dealt with the constitutionality
of "moment of silence" statutes have upheld their constitutionality.
Some courts have even found that a "moment of silence" statute can
have a secular purpose.1 7
prayer numerous times. See Silver, supra note 89, at 216-17. In 1962, shortly after
the Supreme Court decision of Engel v. Vitale, twenty-two senators and fifty-three
representatives introduced constitutional amendments allowing for school prayer. Id.
at 216. In 1982, majorities in both the House of Representatives and the Senate
voted for a voluntary prayer amendment, but both Houses fell short of the two-thirds
majority required to pass a constitutional amendment. Id. Later in 1992, the Senate
defeated a proposed school prayer amendment by a vote of thirty-eight to fifty-five.
Id. More recently, in 1998, a majority of the United States Congress voted to support
the Religious Freedom Amendment, which provided for school prayer. Loeb, supra
note 30, at 1306 (noting that a number of elected officials embrace the view that there
should be a relationship between religious and public life).
215. Johnson, supra note 55, at 1019. These statutes can be differentiated from
the statute in Wallace v. Jaffree. See id. The Court, in Wallace v. Jaffree, found that
the legislative history of the statute demonstrated a blatant attempt to return prayer
into the classrooms. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 61 (1985). Many state
statutes are, however, not rich in legislative history and some states have even
chosen not to record it. See Johnson, supra note 55, at 1019 n. 10. But see Morris,
supra note 63, at 27-28 (noting that many "moment of silence" statutes have code
numbers similar or identical to previous unconstitutional prayer or Bible-reading
statutes and that most statutes allow for a "moment of silence" at the start of the
school day-the time previously set aside for reciting prayers or Bible readings in
public schools).
216. See Richardson, supra note 50, at 212 (analyzing the constitutionality of North
Carolina's Moment of Silence Law and concluding that it would be declared
unconstitutional). The North Carolina statute currently provides for a one-minute
period of silence in an effort "[tjo afford students and teachers a moment of quiet
reflection at the beginning of each ... public school [day]." N.C. GEN. STAT § 115C-
47(29) (1999). Contra Note, The Unconstitutionality of State Statutes Authorizing
Moments of Silence in the Public Schools, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1874, 1893 (1983)
(concluding that "moments of silence" create coercive classroom settings allow the
state to advance and entanglement with religion).
217. See, e.g., Bown v. Gwlnnett County Sch. Dist., 112 F.3d 1464 (1 th Cir. 1997);
Gaines v. Anderson, 421 F. Supp. 337, 342 (D. Mass. 1976) (finding that a
Massachusetts statute that allowed a one-minute period of silence at the beginning of
the school day did not violate the Establishment Clause because the statute had the
secular purposes of aiding the educative function and inducing the respect for the
teacher's authority). In Gwinnett, Mr. Bown alleged that Georgia's Moment of Quiet
Reflection in Schools Act violated the Establishment Clause. Gwinnett, 112 F.3d at
1466. This Act allowed teachers to "conduct a brief period of 'silent prayer or
meditation' at the beginning of each school day." Id. (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-
1050 (1996)). The Act's uncodified preamble provided that "society as a whole" would
be better served if schools provided students with a moment of silence at the
beginning of each school day. Id. The Eleventh Circuit analyzed the statute under
the Lemon Test and found that the Act had the clear secular purpose of providing "a
moment of quiet reflection to think about the upcoming day." Id. at 1472. Further,
the Eleventh Circuit found that the Act neither had the primary purpose of advancing
religion nor did it foster excessive entanglement with religion. Id. at 1473-74.
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The Court's holding in Santa Fe v. Doe is' likely to fuel new
challenges to laws that provide for "moments of silence" in public
schools.2 8  Although the Court intended to limit its holding to the
unconstitutionality of policies permitting student-led, student-
initiated prayer at high school football games, the Court's reasoning
will likely result in successful constitutional challenges to many
"moment of silence" laws. 21 9
For example, Virginia Code § 22.1-203,22o which is similar to other
Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Act did not violate the Establishment
Clause. Id. But see May v. Cooperman, 780 F.2d 240, 241 (3d Cir. 1985) (affirming a
judgment that a New Jersey statute, which allowed a one-minute period of silence for
quiet and private contemplation and introspection, violated the Establishment Clause
because the legislators' entertained a religious purpose when they enacted the
statute); Walter v. West Virginia Bd. of Educ., 610 F. Supp. 1169, 1170 (S.D. W. Va.
1985) (holding that a state constitutional amendment designating a brief time for
personal and private contemplation, meditation, or prayer violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendments because the legislative history revealed a purpose of
returning prayer to public schools).
218. Linda P. Campbell, School Prayer Limited, Decision: Ruling Is the Broadest on
Religion Issue Since 1992, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, June 20, 2000, at 1A
(asserting that Santa Fe could be used to challenge other public school practices such
as "moments of silence"); Richard Carelli, Court Rules Against Stadium Prayer,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 19, 2000, available at 2000 WL 22888189 (stating that the
Santa Fe decision will be likely cited in challenges to school policies allowing for
"moments of silence"); Editorial, Let Us Pray, WALL ST. J., June 21, 2000, at A26
(quoting an ACLU spokesperson to say that laws allowing for "moments of silence
[are] more vulnerable" due to the Court's ruling if the laws can be found to encourage
prayer); Miller, supra note 10, at AIO (reporting that Santa Fe will create new
challenges to "moment of silence" laws). But see Kloehn, supra note 161, at 2
(arguing that the direct effect of the Santa Fe decision will not be that great because it
is unlikely to change spiritual foundations); Jeffrey Weiss, Ruling Hardly Ends Debate
on School Prayer: Decision Focused on Football Games, Not Other Student Efforts,
Many Say, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 20, 2000, at 1A (reporting that the rulings
"relative narrowness" may still allow other types of student-initiated, student-led
religious expression in public schools).
219. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301 (2000).
220. Virginia Code § 22.1-203 provides:
DAILY OBSERVANCE OF ONE MINUTE OF SILENCE. -In order that the right of every
pupil to the free exercise of religion be guaranteed within the schools and
that the freedom of each individual pupil be subject to the least possible
pressure from the Commonwealth either to engage in, or to refrain from,
religious observation on school grounds, the school board of each school
division shall establish the daily observance of one minute of silence in each
classroom of the division.
During such one-minute period of silence, the teacher responsible for each
classroom shall take care that all pupils remain seated and silent and make
no distracting display to the end that each pupil may, in the exercise of his or
her individual choice, meditate, pray, or engage in any other silent activity
which does not interfere with, distract, or impede other pupils in the like
exercise of individual choice.
The Office of the Attorney General shall intervene and shall provide legal
defense of this law.
VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-203 (Michie 2000 & Supp. 1 2000).
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state laws, allows a moment of silence for meditation, reflection, or222
prayer. On its face, Virginia Code § 22.1-203 states that its main
purposes guarantee the students' right to free exercise of religion and
provide the least possible pressure on students to engage in or
refrain from religious observation on school grounds.223 According to
the principles enunciated in Santa Fe, courts are likely to regard
these purposes as religious and to render them unconstitutional.
The Santa Fe Court found the District's policy facially invalid
because the policy unquestionably had the "purpose and . . .
perception of encouraging the delivery of prayer[.] 224 The Virginia
statute indicates that one of its purposes guarantees the students'r i i 225 .. .
right to free exercise of religion. This provision creates the
perception that the schools encourage prayer, and because of that, is
likely found to be facially invalid under Santa Fe.
The statute's other stated purpose, to provide the least possible
pressure on the students to engage in or refrain from religious
observation on school grounds, attempts to survive constitutional
The Virginia Code further provides:
GUIDELINES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL COMPLIANCE FOR STUDENT PRAYER.-To
promote compliance with constitutional restrictions as well as observance of
constitutional rights, the Board of Education shall, in consultation with the
Office of the Attorney General, develop guidelines on constitutional rights and
restrictions relating to prayer and other religious expression in the public
schools. The Board's guidelines shall include, but shall not be limited to,
provisions which address the following: the initiative and involvement of local
school boards, individual schools, administrators, teachers, and students;
the use of school facilities and equipment, including audio systems, and
class time for prayer or other religious expression; and relevant state and
federal constitutional concerns, such as freedom of religion and speech and
separation of church and state. These guidelines shall not be subject to the
requirements of the Administrative Process Act (§ 9-6.14:1 et seq.). However,
in order to provide appropriate opportunity for input from the general public,
teachers, and local school boards, the Board of Education shall conduct
public hearings prior to establishing such guidelines. Thirty days prior to
conducting such hearings, the Board shall give written notice by mail of the
date, time, and place of the hearings to all local school boards and any other
persons requesting to be notified of the hearings and publish notice of its
intention to hold such hearings in the Virginia Register of Regulations.
Interested parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to be heard and
present information prior to the adoption of such guidelines.
VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-280.3 (Michie 2000 & Supp. 1 2000) (internal citations omitted).
221. See Johnson, supra note 55, at 1019 n.6 (citing e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 6-16-
119 (Michie 1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-1-1050 (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, para.
771 (Smith-Hurd 1961 & Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-10.1-7-11 (Bums 1985);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5308a (1985); PA. STAT. tit. 24, § 15-1516.1 (Purdon Supp.
1988)).
222. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-203, § 22.1-280.3.
223. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-203.
224. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 317.
225. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-203.
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scrutiny by creating a pure "moment of silence" law.226 However, the
Santa Fe Court failed to defer to the policy's stated purpose and
found it unconstitutional.227 Similarly, if the Virginia statute's stated
purpose is not given deference, the statute, and other similar state
statutes would likely be found unconstitutional pursuant to the
Establishment Clause and Santa Fe.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has shown little forbearance for the presence
of prayer in public schools. The Court's decision in Santa Fe proved
to be no different. In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, the
Supreme Court found a school district policy that permitted prayer
before high school varsity football games to be facially invalid. The
Supreme Court, for the first time, held that a policy allowing student-
led, student-initiated prayer violated the Establishment Clause.
Despite the Court's attempt to limit its holding to the facts of the
case, Santa Fe will foreclose other government actions. "Moment of
Silence" laws are among the government policies that are ready for
new constitutional challenges. The Court's progression in limiting
prayer in public schools indicates that it will be only a matter of time
before these laws also become constitutional history.
226. See id. At least some commentators believe that such laws would survive
constitutional scrutiny. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 55, at 1040-41, 1044; see also
supra note 214 and accompanying text. Subsection (a) of Maryland's "moment of
silence" law provides an example of a pure "moment of silence" statute. Id. at 1040.
The statute provides that "[pirincipals and teachers in each public elementary and
secondary school in this State may require all students to be present and participate
in opening exercises on each morning of a school day and to meditate silently for
approximately 1 minute." MD. CODE ANN., Educ. § 7-104(a) (1999).
227. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Compare id. with
supra note 172 and accompanying text.
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